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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear this appeal is
conferred

by

§§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and

78-2a-3(2)(j) , Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

The appeal is from a judgment in favor of the

Respondents after a bench trial before the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Third Judicial District Court, on a claim pursuant to
§ 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for judgment in the amount
of the balance due after a trust deed foreclosure against real
property.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Was it error for the trial court to refuse as not

relevant to the issue of fair market value, evidence of the prior
fair market value of the property?
2.
pursuant

Was

the

trustee's

sale under

to Title 57, Chapter

a trust

deed

given

1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

invalid as a matter of law by virtue of the beneficiary stating
that her bid was to purchase the property at its then fair market
value rather than bidding a specific dollar amount?
3.

Was the finding as to fair market value of the property

at the time of trustee's sale supported by the weight of the
evidence?
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STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED
Sections 57-1-27, 28 and 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are
to be interpreted,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought suit to recover the difference between
the unpaid balance owing on a promissory note and the fair market
value of real property against which they had foreclosed under a
trust deed lien given as security.

Defendant alleged that the

trustee's sale was invalid and that the fair market value of the
real property was in excess of the amount which
claimed under their promissory note.

Plaintiffs

The court found an amount

of $29,622.62 owing under the promissory note, that attorney fees
in an amount of $4,980.00 had been incurred by Plaintiffs with
regard to the action and that the fair market value of the real
property at the time of trustee's sale was $21,750.00.
160? Appendix.

R. 159,

The court awarded Plaintiffs damages of $7,872.62

representing the amount owing to Plaintiffs at time of trustee's
sale less the then fair market value of the real property and
additionally awarded Plaintiffs their attorney fees incurred in
the action.
determination

R. 155.

Defendant brings this appeal seeking a

that the trustee's sale was invalid, that the

court's finding as to the fair market value of the real property
was against the weight of the evidence and a reversal of the
judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is an attorney licensed to practice in Utah since
1982.

Tr. 171, 172.

He purchased from Plaintiffs property

located at 448 North Grant Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Tr. 10,

11, 162. The purchase was in September, 1984. Tr. 11, 162. The
property was a single family residence of some 60 years of age.
Plaintiffs1 Exh. 3 at 1; Defendant's Exh. 5 at 3.

Defendant paid

a

delivered

down

payment

of

$8,000.00

and

signed

and

to

Plaintiffs a $25,000.00 promissory note and a trust deed granting
to Plaintiffs a lien against the property for the purpose of
securing payment of the promissory note.

R. 3, 16;

Tr. 13, 26.

On September 5, 1985, Defendant resold the property to Robert B.
Stonehocker.
promissory

Tr. 156, 162.

No payments were made under the

note from and after March

21, 1987.

R. 3, 16.

Defendant understood that he remained responsible to make such
payments.

Tr. 173-174.

On November 24, 1987, the property was sold at trustee's
sale.

Tr. 11, 12.

The Defendant was aware that payments under

the promissory note were in arrears and he had been served with
the notice of default and the notice of sale, but had elected not
to attend

the trustee's sale.

Tr. 167, 168.

The sale was

attended only by the tenant then occupying the property and by
Plaintiff, Kathleen M. Thomas, who was there representing all
Plaintiffs.

Tr. 11, 25.

Only
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the Plaintiffs

bid at the

trustee's sale.

Tr. 12.

Mrs. Thomas did not know the fair

market value of the property and so did not bid a dollar amount,
but rather stated that her bid was for the then fair market value
of the property.

Tr. 12, 13, 25, 26.

She testified she was

prepared to bid as much as $26,000.00 if Defendant or someone
else had bid.

Tr. 13.

Plaintiffs received a trustee's deed to

the property.

R. 5, 16.

The property was first inspected by

Plaintiffs after the trustee's sale.

Tr. 16, 17. The inspection

determined the property to be in disrepair.

Tr. 17, 32.

Plaintiffs listed the property for sale with a realtor, Ms.
Joan Rushton Carlson, on December 7, 1987.

Tr. 15, 16 and 43.

Ms. Carlson arranged to have the property appraised to determine
market value.

Tr. 45, 46.

The appraisal was undertaken by

appraiser, Paul H. Maritsas, on December

10, 1987, and he

completed

Tr. 66, 80.

the same on December

23, 1987.

Mr.

Maritsas determined the fair market value of the property to be
$21,750.00 as of the date of December 23, 1987.
Plaintiffs' Exh. 3 at 2.

Tr. 79, 80;

Mr. Maritsas testified that in his

opinion his valuation would have been the same for the November
24, 1987 date of the trustee's sale.

Tr. 88, 89.

The initial price at which Plaintiffs listed the property
for sale was $32,000.00.

Tr. 43.

Mrs. Thomas testified the

property was listed at that price not knowing its actual value,
not having the benefit of an appraisal, but knowing that such was
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the approximate price at which it had been sold to the Defendant
in 1984,

Tr. 36, 37.

On February lf 1988, the listing price of

the property was reduced to the Maritsas appraised value of
$21/750.00.

Tr. 46.

From the time of the initial listing the

property was continually advertised for a period of seven months
in a bi-weekly trade magazine, was the subject of a realtors1
open housef an office inspection/ a realtors1 bus tour and was
continually over multiple listing.

Tr. 44, 47.

In June of 1988 an offer was received for the purchase of
the property for a price of $20f500.00f with a down payment of
$500.00 and the balance payable in deferred payments.
51; Plaintiffs' Exh. 2 at 1.

One month later the property was

sold to the offeror pursuant to the offered terms.
Plaintiffs' Exh. 2 at 3-8.

Tr. 48/

Tr. 19f 51;

Ms. Carlson had showed the property

to several prospective buyers during the seven months that it was
listed/ but had received only the one offer to purchase.

Tr. 19/

48/ 49.
On July 6/ 1988/ Defendant retained Mr. Richard Copeland to
do a value appraisal

of the property.

completed

one day later.

appraisal

was

Exhibit 5.

received

Tr. 137.

in evidence.

The appraisal

was

Mr. Copeland's written
Tr. 139; Defendant's

He opined the property to have a value of $31,800.00

as of November 27/ 1987/ said date being three days following the
trustee's sale.

The Defendant testified that in his opinion the
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property had a value of between $30,000.00 and $35f000.00 at the
time of the trustee's sale.
testimony

Tr. 170.

His attorney elicited

from Kathleen Thomas that when Plaintiffs sold the

property to Defendant they received an $8,000.00 down payment and
a promissory

note for $25,000.00.

Tr. 26.

Plaintiff's

objection,

refused

the

court

In response to
as

irrelevant,

Defendant's proffered testimony as to the price which he had paid
to purchase the property from Plaintiffs in September of 1984 and
at which

he had

September

resold

of 1985.

the property

Tr. 162-164.

to Mr. Stonehocker

Additionally,

in

the court

sustained Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's attempt to elicit
the opinion of Kathleen Thomas as to the value of the property
when sold to the Defendant in September, 1984, and as to whether
she had at that time obtained a value appraisal of the property.
Tr. 28, 29.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The refusal of the court to permit testimony regarding the
sales price of the property

two and three years before the

trustee's sale and opinion testimony regarding the value of the
property four years before trustee's sale as not relevant to the
issue of fair market value on date of the sale by the trustee was
proper.

In no event would it constitute prejudicial error.

The

court had permitted Defendant to testify as to his opinion of
value at the date of the trustee's sale and to elicit testimony
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from

Plaintiff/

Kathleen

Thomas,

reflecting

September, 1984, purchase price of $33,000.00.

Defendant's
The court

accepted written appraisal reports separately commissioned by
Plaintiffs and Defendant opining as to the fair market value of
the property on the date of the trustee's sale.

It accepted full

and complete testimony from the parties regarding post-trustee's
sale efforts to market the property and the terms and conditions
of

its eventual

sale some seven months

later.

All was a

sufficient and proper basis for the court's finding as to fair
market value at the date of the trustee's sale.
Defendant with full legal notice of the trustee's sale
elected not to attend or bid in accordance with his opinion of
the then fair market value of the property.

His attendance and

his bid of the price which he testified as representing fair
market

value would have constituted his the successful bid,

required his payment of the bid price, and would have been
sufficient to retire his obligation to Plaintiffs and preclude
Plaintiffs' action.
an amount
property

The trustee's sale and Plaintiffs' credit of

equivalent
against

to the then fair market value of the

the Defendant's payment obligation was in

accordance with Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and afforded Defendant the protection contemplated by law.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

identified in open court that

evidence which he perceived to be persuasive with regard to a
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determination of fair market value of the property.

His finding

is supported by the weight of the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
Defendant objects to the trial court's refusal to permit
evidence of the value of the Grant Street property two, three and
four years before the date for which the court was required to
determine fair market value.
Section 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, outlines the
findings to be made by the court in an action to recover the
unpaid balance due upon an obligation secured by a trust deed
lien against real property where the property has been foreclosed
by power of sale and sold at trustee's sale.
Section is hereto appended.

The text of the

It reads in pertinent part:

Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the
fair market value at the date of sale of the property
sold.
The trustee's sale of the property occurred November 24,
1987.

Tr. 11, 12.

Defendant contends that the court wrongfully

refused to accept his proffer of evidence of (1) a November 26,
1983 appraisal report, (2) the price Defendant paid to Plaintiffs
to purchase the property on September 21, 1984, (3) an appraisal
report of fair market value on November 20, 1984, and (4) the
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price at which Defendant resold the property on September lf 1985
to Mr. Robert Stonehocker.

The record will show that evidence of

the price Defendant paid to purchase the property was already
before the court at the time of his proffer and further, that he
made no proffer of evidence as to either the November, 1983
appraisal or the November, 1984 appraisal.
Defendant sought to elicit testimony from Kathleen Thomas as
to whether she had obtained an appraisal of the property prior to
the September, 1984 sale to the Defendant.
objection as to relevancy was sustained.
proffer

Tr. 29.

Plaintiff's

Defendant made no

as to the evidence sought to be elicited.

He now

contends that he was seeking evidence of a written appraisal
report setting fair market value at a date in 1983, some four
years prior
concerned.

to the valuation date with which the court was
Assuming that the court had required Mrs. Thomas to

testify that she had obtained such an appraisal, it then would
have been required to address the hearsay ramifications inherent
in considering the opinion of value as represented by the report
and

in determining

the weight

to be accorded

the report.

Defendant did not represent to the court that he was prepared to
introduce the report or call as a witness the appraiser whose
work and opinion it represented.
made.
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An appropriate proffer was not

Defendant testified that he had purchased the property from
Plaintiffs

in about September of 1984.

sustained

Plaintiff's

objection

on

The court thereupon

relevancy

grounds

to

Defendant's testimony of the price which he had paid for the
property.

Tr. 162.

However, Defendant had previously elicited

testimony from Kathleen Thomas that in purchasing the property,
he had paid Plaintiffs a down payment of $8,000.00 and delivered
to them his promissory note for $25,000.00.

Tr. 26.

In other

words, evidence of his $33,000.00 purchase price for the property
was already before the court.
There is no basis in the record for Defendant's contention
that he was refused an opportunity to provide evidence as to an
appraisal obtained from Paul J. Lund as of November 20, 1984.
such proffer was made and therefore none was rejected.
time did

the Defendant

make any

inquiry

November, 1984 appraisal or with regard

with

regard

No

At no
to a

to one prepared by

Paul J. Lund or one prepared on behalf of Congressional Mortgage,
Inc.

Once again, the Defendant was asked by his attorney to

testify as to the price which he paid to purchase the property in
September, 1984, and the price for which he sold the property to
Robert Stonehocker in September of 1985.

Tr. 162, 163.

It is

impossible to find any attempt to introduce testimony with regard
to a November, 1984 appraisal.
proffer nor the court's rejection.
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There is neither Defendant's

The court precluded, as not relevant, Defendant's testimony
of

the price

at which

he

resold

the property

to Robert

Stonehocker in September of 1985. Tr. 163, 164. Mr. Stonehocker
had previously

testified

that he took the property from Mr.

Johnson as a trade in a real estate transaction.

Tr. 156.

Clearly, the price assigned by the Defendant and Mr. Stonehocker
to the property for trade purposes could not alone be relevant.
Further evidence would be required as to what extent the exchange
of properties determined the value then assigned to the property
and as to adjustments necessary to bring that value in line with
a non-exchange price.
Irrespective of whether any or all of the evidence rejected
by the court can stand the test of relevancy, the precluding of
that evidence would not constitute reversible error.
Verde,

770

P.2d

116, 120

(1989),

the Utah

In State v.

Supreme

Court

determined:
Errors we label 'harmless' are errors which, although
properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.
The evidence presented by the Defendant would lead one to
conclude that the rejected testimony would not have affected the
court's

finding

as to fair market value.

Defendant's own

appraiser, Richard Copeland, opined that the fair market value at
the applicable valuation date was $31,800.00.
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Such was more than

$13,000.00 less than both the November, 1983 appraised value and
the claimed sales price to Robert Stonehocker in September, 1985.
It is $7,000.00 less than what Defendant contends was the value
determined

by the November

20, 1984 appraisal and more than

$1,000.00 less than the price which he paid for the property in
September of 1984.

Finally, and perhaps most persuasive, is

Defendant's own testimony over

the objection of Plaintiffs1

counsel that he believed the property to have a value of between
$30,000.00 and $35,000.00 as of the valuation date.
170.

Tr. 169,

Such evidence as received by the court taken with that

addressing the efforts undertaken by the Plaintiffs over a period
of

some seven months to market

the property, which efforts

resulted in only one offer having been received and the eventual
sale of the property at that offering price, clearly establishes
that in all events the trial court would have found the value of
the property at $21,750.00.
In open court, Judge Frederick analyzed the evidence which
he had received as to the value of the property, addressed the
condition of the property at the time of trustee's sale, efforts
made

to rehabilitate

and market

the same and

compared

the

appraisals made by Mr. Paul Maritsas and Mr. Richard Copeland.
Tr. 178, 179.

It is clear that the additional evidence which

Defendant contends he was entitled to submit would have been
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neither helpful nor persuasive to the court, even if properly
proffered and received.
POINT II.
THE TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS NOT
INVALID AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiffs1 bid at the trustee's sale was not in a specified
dollar amount.

Tr. 26.

Defendant contends that as a consequence

the sale was invalid because (1) Plaintiffs1 bid was not the
highest bid received by the trustee, (2) the trustee was required
to postpone the sale and the failure to do so invalidated the
same, (3) the trustee failed to require payment of the purchase
price in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale
and

(4) Defendant had insufficient time in which to obtain a

separate appraisal more persuasive to the trial court in its
determination of fair market value of the property.
1.
SALE WAS TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER.
Section 57-1-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, dictates the
procedure

to be

followed

by

the trustee

in conducting

a

foreclosure sale in accordance with the power of sale provisions
of a trust deed against real property.
is appended

to this brief.

The text of the statute

In relevant part, the Section

provides:
On the date and at the time and place designated
in the notice of sale, the trustee or the attorney for
the trustee shall sell the property at public auction
-13-

to the highest bidder. . . Any person, including the
beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every bid
is considered an irrevocable offer, . . . .
Not only was Plaintiffs1 the highest bid, it was the only
bid.

Tr. 12.

Mrs. Kathleen Thomas, representing the Plaintiffs

at the sale, did not know the fair market value of the property
and so did not bid a specific dollar amount, but rather stated
that her bid was for the then fair market value of the property.
Tr. 12, 13, 25, 26.
Section 57-1-27 outlines the procedure to be followed by the
trustee if there are competing bids.

When only one bid is given,

he has no alternative under the statute other than to sell to
that bidder

irrespective of the price bid.

disadvantage the trustor for two reasons.

Such does not

First, the trustor has

already received the statutory three-month notice of default as
prescribed

by § 57-1-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the

notice of trustee's sale
Annotated, 1953.
Tr.

167.

required

by § 57-1-25, Utah Code

Both notices were received by this Defendant.

Secondly, § 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

requires that the fair market value of the property at the time
of the sale or the price at which the property is sold by the
trustee, whichever is the greater, shall be credited against the
unpaid balance of the obligation for which the trust deed was
given as security.

-14-

The text of the Section 57-1-32 is appended to this brief.
The pertinent part is as follows:
At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided,
an action may be commenced to recover the balance due
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security. . . .
Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the date of
sale of the property sold. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount
of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses
of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the
date of the sale.
At the sale, Mrs. Thomas advised the trustee that she was
bidding the fair market value of the property.

By so doing,

Plaintiffs assured Defendant that he would receive full credit
for the then fair market value of the property.

Such was in

compliance with the safeguards which the statute extended to the
Defendant.

What then remained to be done was for the Plaintiffs

to obtain an appraisal to determine fair market value of the
property.

They completed that process one month later.

Tr. 80.

This action was later commenced on February 22, 1988 with the
filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint wherein the fair market value of
the property was alleged to have been $22,000.00.

R. 2, 5.

Defendant claims that the failure to bid a sum certain
violated

safeguards extended to him by statute.

burden of proving his contention.

He has the

Concepts, Inc. v. First

Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (1987).

For

the reasons above given, statutory safeguards were not violated,
-15-

and the sale was conducted within the spirit and purpose of the
statute.

On the other hand, if a technical violation did occur,

still the Defendant cannot show, and in fact does not attempt to
show, how he has been damaged or prejudiced.

The Utah Supreme

Court has held that a trustee's sale "will not be set aside
unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was
some attendant fraud or unfair dealing."

Id. at 1160, quoting

McHue v. Church, 583 P.2d 210 at 215, 216 (Alaska 1978).
The Defendant is an attorney licensed to practice in Utah.
Tr. 171, 172.

He received full legal notice of the sale and yet

elected not to attend.

Tr. 167, 168.

He had some four months

time before the scheduled sale date, in which to commission an
appraisal to determine fair market value of the property.
not do so.

He did

He testifies that he then believed the property to

have had a value between $30,000.00 and $35,000.00.

If he had

availed himself of the safeguards afforded by the statute by both
attending the sale and bidding what he then believed to be the
value

of

the property, he would

purchaser.

have been

the

successful

Kathleen Thomas testified that had the Defendant bid

at the sale, she was prepared to bid as high as $26,000.00.
Tr. 13.

Clearly, the Defendant would either have induced that

higher bid by the Plaintiffs, thereby increasing the credit which
he was to have received against his unpaid obligation or would
have made a higher bid which would have resulted in his acquiring
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title to the property.

His failure to do so now precludes his

right to claim "foul".
In American Falls Canal Securities Company v. American
Savings & Loan Association, 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1989) the Utah
Supreme Court determined as follows:
The principles of waiver and estoppel have application
in determining the rights of parties to foreclosure
sales. Hence, a party otherwise in position to object
to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded
from doing so based upon conduct sufficient to bring
into operation the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.
The American Falls court went on to quote from 55 Am Jur 2d,
Mortgages § 861:
(A) Mortgagor may by acquiescence and failure to
assert his rights at the proper time be estopped to set
up irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings to
defeat rights of the purchaser. . .
If to any extent, the trustee's sale was not in compliance
with statute, neither prejudice nor damage was thereby imposed
upon Defendant, and any claim of irregularity otherwise available
to the Defendant
trustee's

sale

was waived
and

avail

by his failure

himself

to attend

of available

the

statutory

safeguards.
2.
THE TRUSTEE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
POSTPONE THE TRUSTEE'S SALE.
Defendant asserts that because Plaintiffs' bid was only for
the fair market value then remaining to be determined, rather
than a specific dollar amount, that the trustee did not actually
-17-

receive a designated price and therefore was required to either
postpone or re-notice the sale.

The obligation of the trustee to

postpone or re-notice sale is found in § 57-1-27, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.

The pertinent part is as follows:

The person conducting the sale may, for any cause
he considers expedient, postpone the sale up to a
period not to exceed 72 hours.
Notice of such
postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last
appointed for the sale. . . In the event of a longer
postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and
renoticed. . . .
Clearly, the statute places postponement and cancellation
within the prerogative of the trustee.

The only conditions

imposed have to do with notice of postponement or cancellation.
Plaintiffs' trustee received their bid, not in a specific dollar
amount, but nevertheless in a sum certain, that being whatever
amount then represented the fair market value of the property.
It was then his obligation to sell the property to Plaintiffs who
would thereupon be required as a condition of this action, to
establish to the satisfaction of the trial court the fair market
value of the property at the time of sale and to credit that
amount against Defendant's unpaid obligation.
3.
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO PAY
FOR THE PROPERTY IN LAWFUL MONEY
OF THE UNITED STATES AT TIME OF SALE
Defendant contends without any reference to the record that
the Defendant, as trustor under the subject deed of trust, had
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given instructions that the purchase price was "payable in lawful
money of the United States at the time of sale".

There is no

evidence of such instruction having been given, and it has no
statutory basis.

The issue of payment at the time of trustee's

sale was not raised below and therefore is not properly raised
here.
Plaintiffs request this court take judicial notice that it
is the standard practice in this jurisdiction for a foreclosing
beneficiary under a deed of trust to place its bid with the
trustee at the time of sale.

Additionally, that if that bid is

for an amount equal to or less than the then unpaid balance of
the obligation for which the deed of trust is given as security
and the bid is the highest bid received by the trustee, the
trustee thereupon declares the beneficiary as the successful
purchaser of the property and executes and delivers his trustee's
deed

to

that purchasing

beneficiary

without

requiring

the

beneficiary to make payment to the trustee.
Utah

R.

Evid.

adjudicative facts.

201

provides

for

judicial

notice

of

This court has recognized its power to take

judicial notice pursuant to the rule although raised for the
first time on appeal.

Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch,

758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

The matter of which the

court is requested to take judicial notice is of common knowledge
among members of the bar and bench of this jurisdiction.
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The Plaintiffs' trustee acting in accordance with the custom
in this jurisdiction did not require the Plaintiffs to make
payment of the amount which they bid as beneficiaries under this
trust deed.

Clearly, the responsibility of the trustee did not

thereby end with the conclusion of the sale and his execution and
delivery of his deed.

Rather, if it were subsequently determined

that the fair market value of the property was in excess of the
amount

then owing by Defendant, the trustee would have been

required to procure and pay over that excess amount to Defendant
or deposit the same with the Clerk of the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, all in accordance with § 57-1-29, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
The

failure of

Plaintiffs

in

the trustee

lawful

money

of

to require payment
the United

States

by

the

did

not

invalidate the sale.
4.
THE CONDUCT OF THE TRUSTEE'S SALE
DID NOT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S
OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN AN APPRAISAL OF
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
The Defendant contends that Plaintiffs by failing to bid a
specific dollar amount and advise him of the same precluded him
from timely obtaining an independent appraisal that would have
been more persuasive to the trial court on the issue of fair
market value.

Plaintiffs were not aware of the fair market value

of the property at the time of the sale and, therefore, did not
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give a specific dollar bid.

Approximately one month after the

sale they obtained the Paul Maritsas appraisal indicating a fair
market value of $21,750.00.

Approximately two months later,

their Complaint was filed alleging

a fair market

value of

$22,000.00.
Defendant testified that he did not attend the sale because
he believed the property had a fair market value in excess of the
amount of his obligation to the Plaintiffs.

Tr. 170, 171.

Despite the fact that the action was filed in February of 1988,
less than three months after the trustee*s sale, the Defendant
waited until July of 1988 to commission his own appraisal of the
property.

Tr. 137.

Plaintiffs did not complete their resale of

the property until July, 1988. Tr. 19, 51; Plaintiffs1 Exh. 2 at
3-8.

Between the filing of the Complaint on February 22, 1988

and the said resale of the property, Defendant had over four
months time in which to commission an appraisal as exacting as
Defendant and his appraiser desired.

Notwithstanding the same,

Defendant's appraiser testified that he went upon the property,
entered the house, inspected the basement but did not go up into
the attic because "I don't carry a ladder with me".
148.

Tr. 147,

He did testify as to the general appearance of the property

and as to its structure as he observed it to be in July of 1988.
Tr. 147.

-21-

The evidence
available

indicates

opportunity

that

to obtain

the Defendant
within

had

every

a reasonable

time

following the t r u s t e e ' s sale such appraisals of the property as
he determined

to be a p p r o p r i a t e .

There is nothing

in

the

evidence to suggest that his voluntary election to do otherwise
prejudiced his a b i l i t y to raise a viable defense.

In any event,

responsibility for any such prejudice would rest with him.
POINT I I I .
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT WITH REGARD
TO THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant contends that the trial court's finding as to fair
market

value of

the property

as determined

appraiser, Paul H. Maritsas, is against
evidence.

by Plaintiffs1

the weight of the

He therefore asserts that the evidence does not

support the trial court's finding that the Maritsas appraised
value of $21/750.00 represented fair market value.
The court's findings were in accord with Rule 52(a) , Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Rule reads in pertinent part as

follows:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, . . . . Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. . .

-22-

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d 191
(1987) has adopted the definition of "clearly erroneous" as given
the Federal counterpart of the Rule in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed.
746 (1948).

It is defined as:

A finding is 'clearly erroneous1 when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.
743 P.2d at 193.
Findings are not disturbed as being clearly erroneous unless
against the clear weight of the evidence or this court is firmly
convinced that a mistake has been made.
P.2d 849, 851 (Utah Ct. of App. 1987).

Adair v. Bracken, 745

In reviewing the issue as

to whether findings find support in the evidence, this court
begins

with

the

review of the trial court's

findings and

Defendant must first marshall all evidence in support of those
findings and then proceed to establish that such evidence is
insufficient.
Defendant

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1985).

fails

to consider

the abundant

Plaintiffs' efforts to sell the property.

evidence

as

to

He avoids such by

wrongfully declaring that "as soon as Mr. Maritsas1 appraisal was
concluded, Plaintiffs' realtor was ordered to immediately sell
the property to the neighbor. . . . "

He fails to recall that the

offer upon which sale was effected was not received until six
months after the appraisal was received.
-23-

The

trial

court

heard

the

testimony

of

Plaintiffs'

appraiser, Mr. Paul Maritsas, as well as that of Defendant's
appraiser, Mr. Richard Copeland.

The court had the benefit of

the additional evidence as is reviewed under Point 1, above, and
then identified in its ruling from the bench the evidence which
it found persuasive in determining
property.
comparing

Tr. 178-180.
the

Specific

two appraisals

and

fair market value of the
items were addressed
the court

cited

what

in
it

perceived as limitations in Mr. Copeland's appraisal.
On December 9, 1988, a copy of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by Plaintiffs' attorney were mailed
to Defendant's
Defendant

filed

attorney.

R. 150.

his objection

On December

to the same.

R.

20, 1988,
146.

On

January 4, 1989, said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were entered by the court.

R. 156, 162.

A copy of the same is

appended to this brief.
The trial court's finding that the property had a fair
market value on the valuation date of $21,750.00 as determined by
the Paul H. Maritsas appraisal is clearly supported by the weight
of the evidence.

The Defendant is unable to demonstrate that the

same is clearly erroneous.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
This action was commenced pursuant to § 57-1-32, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.

The Section provides that ". . .the prevailing
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party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable
attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section."
By

their

Complaint

filed

in the action, Plaintiffs

sought

recovery under said Section of their reasonable attorney fees
incurred in the action.
judgment for the same.

R. 6.
R. 155.

The trial court awarded them
Plaintiffs now seek recovery of

attorney fees incurred incident to this appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court has held ". . .that a provision for
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial,
if the action

is brought

to enforce the contract.

. . ."

Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d
406, 409 (1980).

Plaintiffs' claim lies not in contract but

pursuant to statute.

The same considerations which support an

award of attorney fees on appeal for enforcement of contract
apply for an action brought pursuant to statute whereby attorney
fees are provided.
Plaintiffs respectfully

request that the court determine

that they are entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred with
regard to this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The evidence which the Defendant now contends was improperly
refused by the trial court was either not proffered or was
properly refused.

In all events, the refusal did not constitute
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reversible error.

The fact that the Plaintiffs1

bid at the

trustee's sale was not in a specified dollar amount did not
either

invalidate

safeguards.
attributable
trustee's
statute.

the sale or deny Defendant his statutory

Disadvantages

which he sustained, if anyf

are

to his voluntary election to neither attend the

sale nor exercise

the rights available

to him by

The findings of fact entered by the trial court are not

clearly erroneous but supported by the weight of the evidence.
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney fees which they incur
with regard to this appeal.

,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2*3

day of February, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

P

CERTIFY that on this J^3^~cfey of February, 1990, I did cause
four

true

and

correct

copies

of

the

foregoing

Brief

of

Respondents to be personally delivered to the offices of A. Paul
Schwenke, Esq. at 165 South West Temple, #300, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

APPENDIX
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Section 57-1-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Sale of trust property by trustee — Public auction — Conduct by
attorney for trustee — Trustor may direct order in which trust
property sold — Bids — Postponement of sale.
On the date and at the time and place designated in the
notice of sale, the trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall
sell the property at public auction to the highest bidder. The
trustee, or the attorney for the trustee may conduct the sale and
act at such sale as the auctioneer.
The trustor, or his
successor in interest, if present at the sale, may direct the
order in which the trust property shall be sold when such
property consists of several known lots or parcels which can be
sold to advantage separately, and the trustee, or the attorney
for the trustee, shall follow such directions.
Any person,
including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every
bid is considered an irrevocable offer, and if the purchaser
refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property sold to him
at the sale, the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder. The
party refusing to pay the bid price is liable for any loss
occasioned thereby, including interest, costs, and trustee's and
reasonable attorney's fees. The trustee or the attorney for the
trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of such person.
The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he
considers expedient, postpone the sale up to a period not to
exceed 72 hours. Notice of such postponement shall be given by
public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place
last appointed for the sale. No other notice of the postponed
sale need be given unless the sale is postponed for longer than
72 hours beyond the date designated in the notice of sale. In
the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled
and renoticed as provided for herein in the same manner as the
original notice of sale is required to be given.

Section 57-1-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Sale of trust property by trustee — Payment of bid —Trustee's
deed delivered to purchaser — Recitals — Effect.
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price bid as
directed by the trustee and upon receipt of payment, the trustee
shall execute and deliver his deed to such purchaser.
The
trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the
requirements of §§ 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the
exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described
therein, including recitals concerning any mailing, personal
delivery, and publication of the notice of default, any mailing
and the publication and posting of the notice of sale, and the
conduct of sale. These recitals constitute prima facie evidence
of such compliance and are conclusive evidence in favor of bona
fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the
purchaser, without right of redemption, the trustee's title and
all right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor and his
successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through,
or under them, in and to the property sold, including all such
right, title, interest, and claim in and to such property
acquired by the trustor or his successors in interest subsequent
to the execution of the trust deed.

Section 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to recover balance
due upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security—
Collection of costs and attorney's fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of property
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action
the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for
which such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof
at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall
find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property
sold. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount
by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of
the sale.
In any action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under
this section.
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MERRILL, GEORGE A. MERRILL,
MARGARET M. DURFEE and
ANNIE M. DUTSON,
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C88-01121

JAMIS M. JOHNSON, also known as
JAMIS JOHNSON,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

This matter having come on for trial on the 2nd day of
December, 1988, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, one of
the judges of the Court, with Gary A. Weston of the firm of
Nielsen & Senior appearing as attorney for the Plaintiffs, and A,
Paul Schwenke appearing as attorney for the Defendant.

At the

commencement of trial and in response to Plaintiffs' Motion in

Liminef Defendant withdrew his request to call Philip Cook to
testify as an expert witness.

The Court then proceeded with trial

and the taking of testimony and receipt of exhibits by way of
evidence on the issues, and counsel having addressed the Court
regarding application of law to the evidence presented, the Court
now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 24, 1987, the property commonly known as

448 North Grant Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the
"subject property"), was sold to Plaintiffs at trustee's sale.
2.

The sale was undertaken and consummated in response

to Defendant's failure to make payment to Plaintiffs of certain of
the monthly payments provided to be paid pursuant to the terms of
a trust deed note signed by Defendant incident to Defendant's
purchase of the subject property from Plaintiffs and the payment
of which promissory note Defendant collateralized by a trust deed
which he signed and delivered to Plaintiffs therein describing the
subject property.
3.

Defendant knew of the payment delinquency under the

promissory note and received notice from Plaintiffs of said
delinquency and of the scheduled trustee's sale of the subject
property.
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4.

Defendant had the opportunity to attend the

trustee's sale of the subject property, but did not do so.
5.

Plaintiffs made the only bid received by the trustee

at the trustee's sale.

Plaintiffs did not then know the fair

market value of the subject property, but declared their bid to be
for the amount of the fair market value of the property, whatever
be that value.
6.

Plaintiffs caused an appraisal to be performed of

the subject property by Paul H. Maritsas for the purpose of
determining fair market value of the property.

The appraisal was

completed on December 23, 1987 (Exhibit P-3). The appraisal
estimated the fair market value as of December 23, 1987 to be
$21,750.00.
7.

On December 7, 1987 Plaintiffs listed the subject

property for sale with a licensed real estate salesperson.
property was then listed at a sales price of $32,900.00.

The

On or

about January 27, 1988, the listing price was lowered to
$21,750.00.
8.

Suitable efforts to find a purchaser for the subject

property and to sell and market the property were made by
Plaintiffs and the salesperson with whom Plaintiffs listed the
property for sale.
9.

In June, 1988, Plaintiffs received an offer from

Larry D. Hyde and Kathleen J. Hyde to purchase the subject

property at a price of $20,500.00.
reluctantly to accept said offer.

Plaintiffs determined
The subject property was sold

by Plaintiffs to Larry D. Hyde and Kathleen J. Hyde on or about
July 13, 1988 for the price of $20,500.00.
10.

The offer received by Plaintiffs from Larry D. Hyde

and Kathleen J. Hyde was the only offer received by Plaintiffs for
the purchase of the subject property.
11.

The subject property was in need of structural

repair to roof rafters as of November 24, 1987, and the then
condition of the property significantly impacted fair market value.
12.

On July 6, 1988, Defendant requested Richard W.

Koplin to conduct an appraisal of the subject property to
determine the fair market value of the property.

The appraisal

was completed July 7, 1988 and estimated the fair market value of
the property to be $31,800.00 as of November 27, 1987 (Exhibit
D-5).

Mr. Koplin in performing his appraisal did not inspect the

attic of the subject property nor make sufficient adjustment to
his estimated value of the property to reflect the condition of
the property.
13.

As of November 24, 1987, the date of the trustee's

sale of the subject property, Defendant was indebted to Plaintiffs
under the promissory note and deed of trust in an amount of
$29,622.62, as more particularly itemized in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1.
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14.

As of November 24, 1987, the date of the trustee's

sale of the subject property, the fair market value of said
property was $21,750.00.
15.

Plaintiffs incurred costs, expenses and trustee fees

as a result and consequence of Defendant's delinquency under the
promissory note and of Plaintiffs' foreclosure against the subject
property of the trust deed received from Defendant to secure the
payment of the promissory note.

Plaintiffs made payment to Gary

A. Weston, Attorney at Law, as substitute trustee thereunder said
trust deed for his services relative to the foreclosure of the
trust deed.

Fees of $1,059.00 and costs of $354.70 were so paid.

Said fees and costs are fair and reasonable with regard to the
services rendered to Plaintiffs.
16.

Plaintiffs have incurred attorney fees in an amount

of $4,980.00 with regard to the herein action.

Said fees are fair

and reasonable with regard to the services rendered to Plaintiffs
by their attorneys.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters its Conclusions of Law as follows:
1.

The trustee's sale of the subject property conducted

on November 24, 1987 constituted a valid and proper exercise of
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the rights and power of sale granted by Defendant to Plaintiffs
under Defendant's trust deed given against the subject property
and as granted by Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann., 1953.
2.

Pursuant to the bid made by Plaintiffs at trustee's

sale and Plaintiffs' purchase of the subject property at sale as a
consequence of that bid, Plaintiffs must credit Defendant with an
amount of $21,750.00 against the total amount owing by Defendant
to Plaintiffs at time of trustee's sale, the amount of said credit
being the fair market value of the subject property at the time of
trustee's sale and which credit is required by § 57-1-32, Utah
Code Ann.
3.

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendant,

pursuant to § 57-1-32, Utah Code Ann., Plaintiffs1 attorney fees
incurred in this action.
4.

Plaintiffs are not barred by the doctrines of

estoppel, waiver, release, laches, or either of the same, from
recovery against the Defendant.
5.

Judgment should be entered in favor of the

Plaintiffs and against the Defendant pursuant to § 57-1-32, Utah
Code Ann., as follows:
(a)

For an amount of $7,872.62.

(b)

For attorney fees in an amount of $4,980.00.
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(c)

For Plaintiffs' costs herein incurred.

DATED this
BY THE, COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

A. Paul Schwenke
Attorney for Defendant
58311
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